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Abstract
We analyze sequential and simultaneous price setting under a mixed duopoly with
homogeneous products and symmetric quadratic cost functions. When public firm is the
follower, there exists the case that the equilibrium price is highest of all timings.
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This paper analyzes the price competition in a homogeneous product market under a
mixed duopoly. We consider the case that cost functions are symmetric between two
ﬁrms and they are strictly convex.1 In our model, one private ﬁrm and one public ﬁrm
exist. The former maximizes its own proﬁts. The latter maximizes a weighted average of
social welfare and its own proﬁts.2 Since we do not understand well which ﬁrm is a ﬁrst-
mover, we compare three timings of price setting: (timing S) Both ﬁrms set those prices
simulnateously. (timing V ) First the private ﬁrm sets its price, and second the public ﬁrm
does one. We call this situation ”private price leadership”. (timing B) First, the public
ﬁrm sets its price, and second the private ﬁrm does one. We name this situation as ”public
price leadership”.
From the seminal work of [4], mixed oligopoly becomes one of the major topic in the
theory of industrial organization. Many studies consider quantity competition and deals
with asymmetric linear cost function or quadratic cost function. However, only few analyzes
about price competition. Thus this paper answers a part of left question.
[2] studies a price competition with homogeneous product markets under private oligopoly.
They show that the equilibrium prices are multiple in a pure strategy if cost functions are
symmetric between both ﬁrms.
We show that the equilibrium price under S have a range and it equals to [2] even
though the public ﬁrm exists in the market. We also ﬁnd that the equilibrium price under
V is higher than the one under B and exceeds the range of the one under S under some
condition.3
This paper has 4 sections. Section 2 builds the model. Section 3 solves the equilibrium.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Suppose there are a homogeneous product market which consists of one private ﬁrm and
one public ﬁrm. The demand function is given by D(p)=a − p, where a is positive and
suﬃciently large. The cost function is given by cq2
i, where c is positive and qi is the output
of ﬁrm i, i =0 ,1.
We introduce the following assumptions:4
Assumption
1. Firms have to supply all the demand it faces.
1We consider a quadratic cost function.
2For a rationarization of the objective, see [1]. Using such a objective function, we can deal with several
types of public ﬁrm.
3[2] focuses on a simultaneous price competition, and thus some of our main results are not compared
with it.
4These assumptions are also used in [3].
22. When both ﬁrms choose the same price, they share the demand equally, that is, when
they choose the same price, p, each ﬁrm supplies 1
2D(p) respectively.
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0i f pi >p j.
(1)
Social welfare is given by





2 + π0 + π1 (2)
The objective function of the public ﬁrm U0 and that of the private ﬁrm U1 are given by
U0 = αSW +( 1− α)π0, (3)
U1 = π1. (4)
3 Equilibrium
We consider the three types of the price competition; simultaneous (S), private price
leadership (V ), and public price leadership (B). We restrict our attention to the situation
where each ﬁrm chooses pure strategies.
3.1 Simultaneous price competition







Proof. First we consider an undercut incentive. Since the public ﬁrm counts private ﬁrm’s
proﬁts, the public ﬁrm’s incentive is weaker than the private ﬁrm’s one. Thus we focus on
the private ﬁrm. Suppose the public ﬁrm sets the price p0 ≤ a 3c
3c+2. If the private ﬁrm sets
the price p1 = p0 − , then the increase of revenue is less than the increase of cost. Second
we consider pullup incentive. If Ui < 0 by setting the same price as the opponent’s, ﬁrm
i can increase Ui by pulling up the price.5 Since the public ﬁrm counts the consumer’s
surplus, a price that causes negative U0 is lower than the one that causes negative U1.
Thus we focus on the private ﬁrm. Calculating U1 = 0, we have p1 = a c
c+2.
Note that this proposition is the same result and the similar intuition of [2] because the
public ﬁrm have a weak incentive to set a diﬀerent price from the one of the private ﬁrm
and thus the incentive is not binding. In other words, the public ﬁrm is not beneﬁcial or
harmful for social welfare in simultaneous case.
5Then ﬁrm i supplies nothing.
33.2 Private price leadership















2(1−α)+(3−α)c (Case 4, 5),
where




































2. We note that pV in case 1 and 2 exceeds pS if c<2.
Proof. As we mentioned at the proof of proposition 1, the public ﬁrm has only weak
incentive to undercut. Hence, the private ﬁrm can choose pV from wider range than the
one of pS. In case 1 and 2, proﬁt-maximizing price subjected to the range is inner solution,
a 3c
3c+2.I fc<2, it exceeds a 3c
3c+2.
Note that the public ﬁrm may be harmful for social welfare in private price leadership
case.
3.3 Public price leadership










3c+2 if c ≤
2(1−α)
1+α .
2. When α =1 , pB = a
c
c+1, which coincides with the price under ﬁrst best.
3.
∂pb
∂α < 0, ∂SWb
∂α > 0.
Proof. As we mentioned at the proof of proposition 1, the private ﬁrm chooses the same






. The public ﬁrm knows it and maximizes
U0 subjected to the range because in the case that the public ﬁrm sets price outside the
range, the private ﬁrm chooses a diﬀerent price. In such a situation, the production cost
increases dramatically and thus U1 is damaged. If c>
2(1−α)
1+α , the maximization problem
has an inner solution. If not, it has a corner solution.
4The part 2 is derived by a simple comparison. About part 3, the larger a weighted
average of social welfare is, the more the public ﬁrm concerned with social welfare. As the
production ineﬃciency does not occur as long as both ﬁrms supply, the public ﬁrm can
decrease the price to increase the consumer surplus.
Note that the public ﬁrm may be beneﬁcial for social welfare in public price leadership
case.
Now, we compare pB with pV and ﬁnd that pB <p V. The intuition behind this result
is that the public ﬁrm has an incentive to decrease the price since the public ﬁrm has an
incentive to enhance social welfare.
4 Concluding remarks
We analyze three types of price competition with homogeneous products and symmetric
quadratic cost functions under mixed duopoly. We ﬁnd that the equlibrium price in private
price leadership case is higher than the one in simultaneous case under some condition of
cost parameter, and always exceeds the one in public price leadership case. We also ﬁnd
that the public ﬁrm chooses the same price as the private ﬁrm chooses regardless of the
timing of the price setting.
We have the following intuition from the results: The public enterprises are often
justiﬁed by the reason that they are conscious of social welfare and enhance it. However,
even if they acts for the improvement of social welfare, the existence of them may lead worse
outcome because private ﬁrms would take advantage of such a behavior. Therefore, a price
monitoring in mixed markets is quite important and privatization would be promoted when
a highly marked-up price is sustained.
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